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One year is not enough time to draw conclusions  debate and compromise prevailed in Yugoslavia,
about independent Slovenia's prospects, and it  Slovenia's secession might have decreased
may not be easy for other countries to copy  welfare.
Slovenia's model. Slovenia is ethnically
homogeneous, culturally and historically  *  Slovenia's experience suggests that
compatible with the West, and near (and  secession from a larger entity that is wrecked by
somewhat protected from) friendly Westem  political instability may produce economic
neighbors. And despite sharp political divisions,  benefits. Local autonomy gives Slovenia a
it has shown a political will to fight  chance to introduce a new currency and achieve
counterproductive redistribution. Still,  macroeconomic stability, for example. This can
Slovenia's  experience may offer insights for  work only if the local political constellation is
other new post-Communist economies:  not controlled by coalitions bent on preserving
the old system of redistribution and is not
- Despite the obvious short-run costs of the  hampered by major political divisions that
brutal breakup of Yugoslavia's federal structure,  paralyze decisionmaking.
Sloveaia's medium- and long-run economic
prospects are fairly good. Declining trade with  In short, secession can be beneficial if the
the rest of Yugoslavia tims Slovenia's short-run  new state is more homogeneous and functions
prospects. But in the long run it may benefit  more coherently than the old state.
from greater macroeconomic stability, freedom
from subsidizing less-developed regions of  *  Not all newly independent states would face
Yugoslavia, and speedier integra,ion with  the costs Slovenia has faced. In the Czech-
Westem Europe.  Slovak breakup, for example, political rish and
refugee costs (or rather, the costs of migration)
What has happened to Slovenia does not  were much smaller than in Slovenia. Indeed, the
prove that separation necessarily improves  Czech republic may also expect short-term costs
welfare. In fact, had forces amenable to rational  but long-term gains.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY ...  351. SLOVENIA  AND THE YUGOSLAV  ECONOMIIC  SYSTEM
Below  we  first  provide a  historical background of  Yugoslavia, pointing to  factors
perpetuating differences among regions.'  We  then discuss features of  the  Yugoslavia's
economic system that most importantly influence the adjustment path and overall growth of
Yugoslavia's successor countries.  We argue that (a) more developed regions (MDRs) of
Yugoslavia  heavily subsidized  less developed  regions (LDRs), snd, moreover, Slovenia  was the
region that was (at least in the 1980s)  drained the most; (b) Yugoslavia  was continually  plagued
by macroeconomic  instability, in part because of subsidization  of less-developed  regions and
poorly-performing  enterprises, and (c) due to disintegrative  tendencies  within Yugoslamia,  the
production structure of its constituent  regions was much less influenced  by being a part of a
larger entity than the productioii  structure  of former-Soviet  republics.
1.1  Yugoslav  Development  Report: Perpetuation  of Economic  Differences  Across Regcs
The continual  efforts to change  Yugoslavia's  economic  system  provide an excellent  indicator
of the gravity of Yugoslavia's  many  economic  and political  problems.  After  the break with Stalin
in 1948, Yugoslavia  gradually  abandoned  centralized, Soviet-type  of institutions,  and instituted
a newly conceptualized  system  of self-management.  From its introduction  in the early 1950, the
self-management  system underwent frequent changes. The most significant  ones were the so-
called liberalization reforms of the mid-1960s, and,  as a reaction to them, the negotiated
planning reforms of the mid-1970s.3
Accommodating  its vast ethnic, religious, and cultural differences, Yugoslavia  became a
federation of six republics (later, two autonomous  provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were
created as separate administrative  units within the republic of Serbia).  The federation, it was
thought, would  resolve the burning  national  question, unresolved  in inter-war  Yugoslavia,  bring2
prosperity  for all ethnic  groups  and decrease  regional  disparities.
As can be seen from Table 1, Yugoslavia  did not succeed  in diminishing,  let cdone
eliminating,  regional  differences.  The GNP  per capita  of Slovenia  rose from 160%  to 200%  of
the Yugoslav  average  between  1955  and 1988,  while  the GNP  per capita  of Kosovo  fell from
40%  to 24%  in the same  years.  Indeed,  of the less-developed  regions,  Kosovo,  Montenegro,  and
Bosnia-Herzegovina  all saw  their  GNP  per capita  decline  relative  to the Yugoslav  average,  with
only  Macedonia  showing  improvement.
Tabkk  1
Basic  Indicators  of Yugoslavia  and Its Republics
Y.So  B..  Made.  CWsh  MamO.  I3m  ae&
I_,_.___  s  ,_  _  I
P_padt  1953  3  16.7  2.  232  7.7  8  41.1  2.3  4  10
191  10I0  US.  2.7  192  S.9  8.2  41  J  24.4  Y2  4.7
Pqp  Ok  1988  2300  447  059  4683  2111  194  gm  S  1939  2951
Gtb&  Rs*  Ig19S  8.1  9  0.9  10.3  3.1  1.3  23.2  -1.6
GNP  Per  1955  _C0  so  IID  120  0  OD  so  110  40o3
CWHOIm  UO0  65  71  129  6  2C0  a  1  O"  24  I1N
GNP  *1953  IOD  14.4  1B  2C.7  5.2  14.3  37.5  25J  2.2  9.9
1931  10IO  12.7  2  2SJ  5J7  I"  37.5  24.9  2.2  IOA
&y  *  1973  ICO  10  11.2  2  3153  Si  19i  37.1  2A7  IJ6  8A
Igoe  UO  16A8  IJ  20.6  5.3  22  332  22.7  t.4  9.1
_ *  ~~~~~1973  l0O  S.5  13  24.5  4.1  xi  2SS  22.1  1.2  5.6
1909  ICO  12.9  1.1  26.6  6  ISi  33.1  21.1  1.2  IOS
Pbe A  l  _*  1953  ICO  13.6  0.9  2S.2  4.2  20.1  33  22.7  1.7  S.
19ES  ICO  153  32  25A  Ss  16.9  33  20X  2.9  9.6
Waf"  1955  ICO  14A  242  27.2  6  IS  34A  23  2  9a
1939  ICOo  15A  2.5  23S  7.7  12.4  3S.1  2S.2  3 S  9.4
U_'jy  *  19IS  hOD  S.9  1.4  2S.S  143  IOA8  35.9  21S9  3S  10.2
1969  ICO  23.1  3.9  11.6  12.4  23  41L7  26.7  11.6  8.4
U  emlo.  Rsw  1999  11.6  16.2  19.2  6.6  17.4  2S  10.6  2L5  11.2
b-e  19S9  0.25  0X  0.4  0.17  0.12  O IS  0.19  0j6  0.24
e:  pn]ercentage  of naLional  avera e.
(1)  Person.
(2)  Per 1000.
(3)  Persons who migrated in percentage of total population.
S uc:  Statistical Yearbook  of Yugoslavia,  various  years3
In part, the poor showing  of LDR GNP per capita  can be explained  by rapid population
growth. It is noteworthy,  however,  that Macedonia,  which  had the second  highest  population
growth  rate of aU  the LDR's,  was nonetheless  able  to increase  its GNP  per capita  relative  to the
Yugoslav  average. This implies  that population  growth  cannot  be the only factor  explaining
weak  LDR GNP per capita  growth.
The strengths  of Slovenia  can be further  illustrated  by examining  GNP  and export  shares.
Slovenia's  share  of Yugoslav  exports  consistently  exceeded  its share  of Yugoslav  GNP,  thanks
to the superior  competitiveness  of Slovenia's .;onomy.  Furthermore,  Slovenia's  share of
Yugoslav  exports  grew from 1973  to 1989, while that of al  the LDR's except  Bosnia  fell
slighdy. Clearly,  the gap between  Slovenia  and the LDR's widened  over  the years. This  was
true  despite  the growing  share  of LDR's  in Yugoslavia's  fixed  assets,  contrasted  with  Slovenia's
decline  from 20.1 to 16.9%.
1.2  Salient Features of Yugoslavia  thiat  Influence  the Adjustmen Plath  of Constituent  Units
A.  State  Paternalism.  Cross-Subsidization  and Subsidization  of Less-Devlopdc  Regions.
The feature  of the Yugoslav  system  that can be singled  out as the most  important  cause  of
its failure  is state paternalism,  that is, a monoparty  political  system  coupled  with ill-defined
property  rights. 3 That system  was characteized  by massive,  pervasive  redistribution  through
a soft budget constraint,  a system  where profitable  firms were discretionaUy  taxed and the
proceeds  were used  to bail out unprofitable  firms.
Besides hampering  work incentives  and contributing  to  an  unstable macroeconomic
environment  (see below), soft-budget  redistribution  also included significant  interregional
redistribution  of income  from  more  developed  to less developed  regions  of Yugoslavia.  Below4
we summarize  the results of the empirical study by Kraft and Vodopivec  (1992) on all (8,689)
Yugoslav  manufacturing  enterprises, for 1986.
To do justice to the redistribution  in the Yugoslav  economy,  Kraft and Vodopivec  introduced
several  nonstandard  types  of tax and subsidy  imposed  on firms. Besides  formal taxes  and formal
subsidies, they considered two much less vgsible  forms: (1) quasisubsidies  and quasitaxes,
defined  as compulsory  financial  investments  with large stipulated  negative  returns, and (2) "gains
and losses on money," defined as the appropriation  of financial savings based on an inflation
tax. 4 Gross taxes thus consisted  of formal taxes, quasitaxes,  and "losses  on money," and gross
subsidies  consisted  of formal subsidies,  quasisubsidies,  and "gains on money.
Kraft and Vodopivec  found that formal taxes and subsidies  in Yugoslavia  were only the tip
of  the  iceberg, and  that  redistribution of  income was  massive,  with  net  subsidies in
manufacturing  of 18 percent of income or 15.6 percent of manufacturing  GDP (table 2).  For
the purpose of the present  paper, however, their more important  findings  relate to interregional
redistribution. The less-developed  regions (LDRs) of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia, Montenegro,  and Kosovo)  were the main beneficiaries  of redistribution. The main
source of redistribution was subsidized  credits, as shown by large net money gains of LDRs
manufacturers  (see table 2, column 1).  Aided by transfers  from the "Fund for Development  of
Less-Developed  Regions," LDRs were also able to levy much lighter taxes and quasitaxes on
their enterprises  than the more-developed  regicns (MDRs). Looking  at the overall  redistribution,
net subsidies  for LDR manufacturing  amounted  to a stunning  57 percent of LDR's income from
manufacturing;  and net subsidies  for Montenegro's and Kosovo's manufacturing  considerably
exceeded  the twu regions's income from manufacturing! The enterprises of only one region,5
Slovenia, were net tax-payers.
Table 2
Redistribution  by Republic  and Autonomous  Province"
(as a percentage  of income)
FIml  Fotmal  Qotal  QM1-  L^ou On  ad"  o  N
To=  SUb  Tam..  8MIh.  MMy  Moa  _d_W_
Yu406vis  14  I  25  13  Be  132  is
lewd.wkya  9  l  19  12  105  177  57
11b  9  1  21  II  118  178  43
Mmpo  8  I  to  15  104  236  123
Me"  11  0  17  13  16  135  35
Kayo  8  0  Is  15  d6  22  145
M -4'eapd  16  l  27  13  83  117  5
Ctma  15  1  32  10  6  136  133
SIMb  17  0  23  24  77  83  .11
So"  (3)  16  I  25  9  84  125  10
(1) Income-weighted  mean of firms' rates (the firms' rdistributie  flows as a percentage
(2) Defined as the difference  between the sum of sub.idy rates and the sum of tax rates.
(3) A defect in the data base made it impossible  to distinguish  Vojvodina  from Serbia proper.
The two are listed as "Serbia" here.
Sour:  Kraf, and Vodopivec (1992)
Even though the data allow us to determine only the recipients, not the donors of net
subsidies,  the data suggest  that transfers  from richer to poorer regions well exceeded  the levels
mandated by law (1.5 to 2 percent of GDP for the more developed regions).  The most
important source of subsidies  was net money  gains and such gains were financed  by taxing  the
population  at large. Even if one assumes  that taxes were spread  evenly  across republics  (ignoring
direct  transfers  from more-developed  to less-developed  regions),  the more-developed  regions turn
out to be net taxpayers (at 13 percent) and the less-developed  regions net beneficiaries  (at 40
percent) -- substantially  above the rate that wouWd  be generated  through mandated  transfers.5
The heavy subsidy of LDRs suggests a Gerschenkronian  interpretation  -- the government-6
mediated  transfer  of capital  to fight backwardness  (Gerschenkron  1962).  The less-developed
regions appear to be using fiscal  policy and bank credits to promote  and direct industrial
development.
More-developed  regions  have  always  looked  upon  development  tansfers as a burden,  so it
is surprising  that actual  redistribution  exceeded  mandated  levels. There  are two  reasons  for  this.
First, such  subsidies  are the outcome  of the federation  yielding  to the LDRs' pressures  to put
out the fire -- that is, to make  up for both enterprises'  losses  and local governments'  deficita.
Second, Yugoslavia'  developmc-  t plan for LDRs has historically  favored capital-intensive
industries. That  plan was backed  with concessionary  credits  and direct  investments  by firms
from MDRs  in LDRs.
Yugoslav  observers  have noted that price distortions  favored  the MDR's. According  to
estimates  by Kraft  (1992b),  the introduction  of equilibrium  goods  prices  would  have  increased
enterprise  revenues  at the expense  of wages  in all regions.  However,  Slovenia  would have
received  revenue  equal  to 2-5%  of social  product,  while  Kosovo,  the region  most  hurt  by price
distortions,  would  have  received  revenue  equal  to 9.8 to 12.9%  of social  product.  This  implies
that  price distortions  took  back  subsidies  of 7.8%  to 7.9% of social  product  for Kosovo  relative
to Slovenia--a  rather insignificant  sum comp&red  to the 145%  of social  product  soft-budget
subsidy  calculated  for Kosovo  in Table  2.
B. Macroeconomic  Instability
State  paternalism  underlay  macroeconomic  imbalances  in Yugoslavia.  As discussed  above,
the government  redistributed  significant  portions  of GNP through  (1) ad hoc interventions
(taxation  or subsidization)  into  the distribution  of income  at the firm level,  and (2) (mis)use  of7
the financial  system. Unprofitable  firms  got subsidies  (such  as straight  subsidies,  concessionary
crediting,  and tax waivers)  that were  in turn converted  into components  of demand. But this
massive redistribution  of  income was typically  only partly financed  by fiscal revenues.
Yugoslavia  traditionally  relied heavily on  monetary expansion to  finance government
interventions  -- with unavoidable  inflationary  implications.
It might  seem that fiscal  imbalances  could not account  for Yugoslavia's  macroeconomic
instabllity,  because  Yugoslavia  always  had a balanced  budget. Rocha  (1992)  argues  that the
impression  of a balanced  public  sector  budget  is false  -- that there  was a hidden  but real deficit
of significant  proportions.  This  deficit  consisted  mainly  of implicit  subsidies  to enterprises  (1)
by providing  domestic  credits  at highly  negative  real inteiLest  rates, and (2) through  a foreign
exchange  insurance  scheme  that allowed  enterprises  that take out foreign  loans  to shift the
repayment  of their debt  onto the shoulders  of commercial  banks  or the central  bank, financed
by the inflation  tax.  (See  also  Bole  and rGaspari  1991.)
Bole  and Gaspari  (1991)  show  that other  facts  also  contributed  to inflation  in Yugoslavia  --
especialy  the inconsistent  economic  policy  itself. Sporadic  price controls  in particular  blocked
relative  price adjustments,  so that exchange-rate  adjustments  influenced  only the general  level
of prices  without  affecting  the structure  of production.  Their  very repetitiousness  showed  the
ineffectiveness  of price controls.  Targeted  price  increases  escalated  whern  the price  freeze  was
lifted,  thus  increasing  inflationary  expectations.
Bole  and  Gaspari  also  find  that  wage  and  monetary  policy  also  generated  significant  inflation.
In addition,  the external  imbalance  that  necessitated  an exchange-rate  adjustment  contributed  to
inflationary  pressures.8
When workers can fight price increases  by raising their wages, one mechanism  to reduce
wages  (the so-called  Pozos-Simonsen  mechanism)  is to permanently  increase  the rate of inflation.
This points to the presence  of the other, traditionally  recognized  character  of inflation  in socialist
countries: cost-push  inflation. But it is important  to realize that inflation  in Yugoslavia  was not
only  fueled by  mounting costs. Unless Yugoslavia addressed the fundamental imbalances
associated with the subsidization  of enterprises, it would have had no chance for permanent
stabilization.
C.  Regional  Production  Structure and Disintegrative  Tendencies.
The liberalization  reforms of the mid-1960s  and institutional  changes  in the 1970s  triggered
the creation of regional  barriers which  prevented  the creation  of a genuine  national  market. This
hindered  interregional  trade within  Yugoslavia  and, at the same time, pushed  regions to external
trading. These tendencies  have  produced  a production  structure  much less geared to a Yugoslav
market than the one that would have evolved either under central planning  or under a genuine
economic  union. The newly  created  independent  parts of former Yugoslavia  thus find it is easier
to reorient productior io markets outs'  4e Yugoslavia.
The reforms of the mid-1960s '1oved Yugoslavia toward decentralization, autonomy of
enterprises,  and reliance on the market as means of coordination. The most significant  changes
involved transferring a large part of the federal government's responsibilities  to republics,
increasing the autonomy of enterprises in price formation and the distribution of enterprise
income into personal incomes and accumulation, adjusting relative prices to world prices,
transferring responsibility  for resource mobilization  and allocation from the state to economic9
enterprises and banks, and introduction  of a unified exchange rate instead of multiple ones
(Schrenk  et al, 1979, p. 26).
To regain a grip on the economy, the government  launched a new wave of reforms in the
1970s, introducing  "negotiated  planning." The government  indeed regained much of its former
control, but it was regional and communal, rather than federal, govemment  that took charge
in  the  1970s and  1980s. Governments exerted control through informal pressures for the
execution  of certain  projects,  and against the execution  of others. They were driven by concerns
about securing  goods in short supply,  or to utilize  raw materials  produced  locally  and "exported"
to vther regions at controlled  prices. Not surprisingly,  control strengthened  autarkic tendencies,
rounding-off  the local economies.
e  resulting decline of  interregional trade  is  seen  clearly in  Table 3.6 All  regions
experienced  decreasing  share  of deliveries  outside  the home republic  in the years 1970 to 1987.
The declines range from the relatively mild 3.8 percentage point decrease experienced by
Macedonia tO the  remarkable 18.2 percentage point decrease experienced by  Vojvodina.
Slovenia's 6.5 percentage point decrease occurs in the middle of this period, with most of the
decrease occurring between 1970  and 1974.10
Table 3
The Share of Deliveries  Outside  One's Republic  or Province in
Total Deliveries  of the Republic  or Province, 1970-1987
YEAR
SR & SAP  (Percent)
1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980  1983  1987
Bosnia-Hergovina  36.8  34.8  39.1  32.7  30.6  29.1  29.6  27.5
Mantenegro  51.3  46.8  44.5  37.3  32.2  34.5  34.3  33.1
Croatia  37.2  36.3  35.5  31.4  29.9  28.1  28.7  27.1
Macedonia  33.5  33.4  31.7  36.6  35.4  33.6  31.6  29.7
Slovenia  42.2  40.8  36.7  35.5  35.5  35.7  37.9  35.7
Serbia  31.2  40.5  29.4  26.3  22.6  22.5  24.6  23.6
- Sebia Proper  40.0  39.3  37.5  34.8  30.8  30.2  34.3  32.9
- Vojvodina  50.0  42.4  43.8  38.4  34.7  35.6  33.0  31.8
- Kosovo  43.4  37.8  44.2  37.4  37.1  34.4  31.0  29.8
SQuIc:  Federal Secretariat  for Market and General  Economic  Affairs, "Analysis  of the
Functioning  of the Unified Yugoslav  Market", Belgrade, Nov. 1987.
Savic, Nebojsa, "Competition  on the Domestic  Market", Economics  Institute  Belgrade,
1989
Levels of interregional  migration  were also low in Yugoslavia.  Certain types of migration
were fairly common, such as Bosnian migration to Slovenia, but the overall levels were not
large. Table 4 shows migration  levels as of 1989. Yugoslav  migration  appears to be an or.uer
of magnitude  lower than that of most OECD countries.11
Table 4
Interregional Migration  in Yugoslavia  and Selected  OECD Countries
(Persons Who Migrated in Percentage  of Total Population)
Regions (1)
Yugoslavia  (1989)  0.25


















United States  2.8
Note:  (1) Regions  in Yugoslavia  are RAPs; definitions  in other countries
vary (in Germany, for example, cities are also taken as regions).
Sourc:  Internal material  of the Statistical  Office of Yugoslavia
(interregional  migration);  OECD  Employment  Outlook,  OECD, Paris, July
1990.
Finally, the system of foreign  trade stimulated  balanced  foreign  trade by each region, so the
regions were explicitly  encouraged  to look at their own comparative  advantage  vis-a-vis  the rest
of the world. Specialization  within Yugoslavia  was de-emphasized,  and the effects  of decisions12
on Yugoslavia's balance of payments was subordinate to the effect on individual republic's
balance  of payments. This added a final element to Yugoslavia's  economic  disintegration.
2. THE FIRST ECONOMIC EXPERIENCES OF INDEPENDENT SLOVENTA
Slovenia's exit from Yugoslavia  has allowed  it to manage  its own economic  affairs. In the
first year, the record is impressive: Slovenia  has successfully  introduced a new currency, the
tolar, brought inflation from a monthly rate of 21.5% in October 1991 to a monthly rate of
1.4% in August 1992, accumulated  nearly $1 billion of foreign reserves, and created the basic
institutions and instruments for effective macroeconomic  policy. It seems doubtful that such
accomplishments  would have been possible  in a unified Yugoslavia,  even without the war.
Naturally, much more remains to be done. Privatization  legislation was not passed until
November, 1992, impeding progress in this important area.  Enterprise and financial sector
restructuring  remains mainly  in the preparatory  phase. Similarly,  reforming  labor  legislation  and
labor market practices has begun, but much more can be expected.
Below we first describe the introduction  of the new Slovenian  currency. 7 Then we discuss
Slovenia's new macroeconomic  policies  and institutions,  especially  in the monetary sphere, that
facilitated  macroeconomic  stabilization.  The section  concludes  with a discussion  of restructuring
and future programmatic  issues.
2.1 Gaining Economic  Control: the Introduction  of the Tolar
To assert its economic self-determination,  independent  Slovenia needed to gain control of
fiscal and monetary  policy. Fiscal control proved easier, because, like other regions in former
Yugoslavia, the fiscal system and policy had been for the most part under the control of13
Slovenian  authorities since the constitutional  reform of 1974.8  To gain full control, Slovenia
simply stopped  paying taxes to the Federal Government  and took over customs.
Slovenia began its push for monetary control by (re)drafting  laws regulating the financial
system in the fall of 1990. Tnese included  the Bank  of Slovenia  law, the Banking  Law, and laws
regulating  bank supervision, bank liquidation,  deposit insurance, international  credit relations
and customs.  With the exception  of the Banldng  Law, the financial  laws  are similar  in instrument
design and institution  set-up to the old federal Yugoslav  financial  laws amended  on the federal
level in the late 1980s.9  However, based on experience  with the expansionary  monetary  policies
of the Yugoslav central bank, the central bank law gave the Bank of Slovenia (BoS) full
independence in  conducting  monetary  policy.  This  proved  crucial  in  implementing
macroeconomic  stabilization  policies  after October 1991.
These financial laws were passed in June 1991 together with the declaration  of Slovenian
independence.  Their implementation  was temporarily  suspended  due to the outbreak  of the war
and the subsequent  Brioni Accord that froze further moves towards independence  for the next
three months.
The introduction  of a new currency  became  an imperative  once the NBY's monetary  policy
became totally subservient  to Serbia's war finance needs. The main impetus for implementing
currency  reform was thus to prevent the republic from being sucked into the inflationary  spiral
of the dinar monetary zone.
The currency reform was undertaken  immediately  after the expiration  of the Brioni Accord
moratorium  in October 1991. The new currency, named the tolar (SM.  was well-received  by
the  public.  Its  introduction proceeded remarkably smoothly." 0 Some 8.6  billion  YUD,14
equivalent to about $75 per head, were exchanged.  Bank deposits  were automatically  converted
into tolars. Financial contracts were left untouched by the conversion, since Slovenian law
stipulates  that contracts  can be written  in any currency.  External  payments  with former  Yugoslav
regions required some new arrangements,  which were concluded  in the ensuing month.
2.2 Successful  Macroeconomic  Stabilization
In contrast to the unsuccessful  stabilization  attempts of the federal Yugoslav authorities,
Slovenia  by and large had stabilized  its economy  by the faU  of 1992.11  Perhaps the key was the
monetary policy of  the Bank of  Slovenia. The BoS policy,  the exact opposite of  NBY
redistributive and expansionary  monetary  policies, strengthened  the soundness  and stability  of
the new currency.
Monetary  policy  was supported  by a market-determined  exchange  rate policy, which  resulted
in the buildup of Slovenia's international  reserves.' 2 Only in summer 1992, with the advent of
a new government, was restrictive monetary  policy supported by stabilization-oriented  fiscal
policies  as well.
Table 5 shows the main contours of the stabilization.  In the sections  below, we outline the
impact of macro policy in more detail.Table  S: Sbvenia 1986-1992
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A. Fiscal  Reform
In early 1991,  Slovenia  put its public finance  system  on a comparable  footing  with the
developed  market  economies.  The  system  of direct  taxation  was  revised  and  the number  of taxes
and contributions  was drastically  reduced.  Slovenia  introduced  corporate  profit and personal
income  taxes,  while  social  security  contributions  paid  by employers  and  employees  were  retained
only for pension  and disability  insurance,  and health  and unemployment  insurance.
During  1991,  inflation  erosion  of collected  revenues  and  arrears  from  enterprises  hurt  by the
collapse  of trade the rest of former Yugoslavia  put revenue  collection  well below target.
Government  expenditures  were  also  cut significantly  in real terms,  and government  wages  were
frozen.  Public  expenditure  was reduced  to 43.2% of GDP  in 1991,  in comparison  with  48.9%
in 1990.  Most  of the reduction  came  from reducing  Slovenia's  contribution  to the Yugoslav
federal  government  budget  to 0.9% of GDP  in 1991  from  7.2% in 1990.
The  budget  deficit  of 2.6% of GDP  in 1991  was  not alarming  by international  standards,  and
indeed  quite  modest  compared  to other  Central  European  economies  in transition.  But  the  budget
did not include  provisions  for enterprise  and bank  restructuring,  and the large  domestic  burden
denominated  in foreign  exchange  deposits  was also  not properly  accounted  for.
The fiscal  policy  stance  improved  only  in summer  1992,  as the new  Government  attempted
to address  restructuring  issues  by earmarking  funds  for loss makers  and cutting  other current
expenditures.  The government  also improved  its cost management.  This, together  with the
continuation  of restrictive  monetary  policy,  brought  inflation  in August  1992  to a monthly  rate
of 1.4%.17
B. Restrictive Monetary  Policy
The success  of macroeconomic  stabilization  in independent  Slovenia  can be largely attributed
to the smooth  currency  introduction,  and restrictive  monetary  policy, both the efforts of the Bank
of Slovenia (BoS). The continuously  restrictive BoS monetary policy of the first independent
year was a real change from the previous redistributive  and expansionary  monetary  policy.
Table 5 above illustrates the tightness of monetary  policy after independence.  Ml  actually
shrank in  nominal terms in the first month after independence.  M2 growth was also quite
moderate, as was the growth in foreign liabilities.
A crucial  factor enabling  restrictive  policy  was central  bank independence,  established  by the
law on the Bank  of Slovenia.  The Law mandates  the BoS alone to execute  monetary  policy, free
from political interference.  Price stability  and smoothly-functioning  domestic and international
payments are its only objectives. The most important provisions of the Slovenian law that
distinguish  it from the former Yugoslav  law are: independence  of BoS supreme  bodies, the BoS
relation to the Government,  and enhanced  indirect monetary  instruments.
Independence  of BoS Supreme  Bodies.  The Governor  and the members  of the Board cannot
be connected with the Government or any organization  controlled by  the BoS. The Board
consists of the Governor, Deputy Governor, three Vice-Governors  and six independent  experts.
All are appointed for 6 years by Parliament. The Governor and six independent  experts are
nominated  by the President, while the Govemor nominates  the Deputy Governor  and three Vice
Governors.
By contrast, the Board of the National Bank  of Yugoslavia  consisted  of the eight governors
of the regional National  Banks  of republics, and the Governor  of the NBY. Only the Governor18
of the NBY was elected on the federal level, while the other governors were elected in the
regions' parliaments, anci represented regional interests in  the NBY. The 1974 legislation
provided that the NBY Board should vote by consensus to prevent republican  influence. The
consensus vote was soon (in the inflationary 1980s) replaced by ordinary majority vote to
accommodate  the economic  interests of less developed  regions and Serbia, which effectively
controlled the NBY apparatus." 3
The BoS's Relation to the Govemment.  To reduce direct financing of  the government
deficit, the law allows the BoS to extend only short-term  loans to the government  for bridging
cash-flow  problems. The stock of these loans cannot  exceed five percent of the current budget,
nor 20 percent of the total budget deficit.
As mentioned  above, the former Yugoslav legislation  required a balanced federal budget,
and, in principle, also excluded the possibility  of direct budget financing by the central bank.
However, indirect budget financing  through quasi-fiscal  deficits was widely  practiced.(Rocha,
Saldanha 1992)
Enhanced Indirect  Montar  Instruments,  To enhance  the effectiveness  of monetary  policy,
the Law allows  the BoS  to employ  all commonly-used  monetary  instruments,  including  a variety
of open market operations that exert impact through  interest rates. Although the NBY enjoyed
similar provisions, it preferred direct instruments  like selective  credits and credit control. The
BoS  Law totally excludes  the use of selective  credits, while the use of other direct  credit controls
is prohibited beyond December 31, 1993. This underscores  the commitment  of the authorities
to the use of indirect monetary  control." 419
C. The Market Determined  Exchange  Rate Poicy
The objective  of Slovene  exchange  rate policy was to reinforce macroeconomic  stabilization
and to promote economic  integration with the West, with a final objective  of making the tolar
completely  convertible  while pegged to the DEM. The main vehicle for achieving this was a
market determined  tolqr  exchange  rate. This contrasts  sharply with the administration  regulation
of dinar exchange  rates in the 1970s and 1980s.
The tolar is expected  to derive its strength  from strict macroeconomic  policies  and a healthy
balance of payments."' At the time of currency introduction, Slovenia  was not a member of
international organizations and  was not about to receive any financial support. Since the
country's level of net international  reserves was low--at  the end of September  1991 reserves in
the banking system only amounted to $204 million, and the BoS had literally no reserves--a
floating exchange rate was introduced, with some exchange restrictions imposed to protect
reserves.
The initial lack of  foreign exchange compelled the  BoS to  introduce some exchange
restrictions, including freezing  of foreign  exchange deposits. These were partly lifted later, as
Slovenia's  reserves  grew. However,  deposits  will only be completely  unfrozen  after Yugoslavia's
foreign  exchange  claims and liabilities  are settled, as part of bank and enterprise ownership  and
restructuring  reforms.
Importantly,  banks cover exchange risk by extending domestic  credit in foreign exchange,
and not by general BoS guarantee. Such a guarantee  was the main source of NBY  los3es  in the
1980s; it came to be known as the "black  hole".20
2.3 Restructuring  ExpeRdences  and Programmatic  Issues
While Slovenia  has been  a pathbreaker  in its rapid and successful  accomplishment  of currency
reform and macroeconomic  stabilization,  it has made less progress on restructuring  issues. In
particular, ownership change has been glacial, financial  sector restructuring  has not occurred,
and labor-market  institutions  are only beginning  to be changed.
A. Privatization  Policy
Slovenia  has gone slowly  on privatization.  Whereas  other ex-Communist  states moved  rapidly
to privatize  small enterprises, Slovenia  decided  not to privatize  small enterprises  separately. As
a result, most of the growth of the private sector has occurred through the start-up of new
enterprises. Registered  commercial  companies  roughly tripled between 1989 and 1991. Private
sector employment  increased by 4%, and self-employment  by 8.1% in 1991.(Pleskovic  and
Sachs, 1992  p. 36. See also Kraft (1993) for information  on the growth of the private sector in
pre-war Slovenia.)
No less than three privatization  bills  were considered  by the Parliament  of Slovenia.  The two
failed  bills represented  diverging  approaches:  one favored  internal  privatization  through  worker-
manager  buyouts, and the other favored external  privatization  through distribution  of shares to
citizens  and pension  funds, coupled  with the establishment  of mutual  funds. The latter approach
is similar to methods  used in Czechoslovakia,  Russia and Poland.
Internal  privatization  was denounced  by Professor  Jeffrey Sachs. Sachs argued  that the plan
unfairly benefitted  existing managers,  was open to speculation  since accurate evaluation  without
functioning  capital markets is impossible,  and failed to fit the circumstances  of large, capital
intensive  and expensive  enterprises (Pleskovic  and Sachs, 1992, p. 38)21
Defenders  of internal  privatization  argued that Slovene  managers  are not typical  of managers
in Communist  countries. Many are highly capable, and quite familiar with management  in a
market milieu. Furthermore, Slovene workers may have taken advantage  of self-management
structures to achieve a degree of participation  in management.  Insider privatization therefore
makes sense in Slovenia,  they argue, as a way of utilizing workers' and mangers' finm-specific
knowledge  and of nurturing the efficiency  advantages  of worker participation.
A compromise bill was finally  passed in November 1992, combining  internal and external
approaches. The bill permits sale of the whole enterprise, employee  purchase, or transfer of
shares. The latter approach  requires 10%  of the book value of social capital to be distributed  as
shares to the Slovenian  Pension and :'valid  Fund, 10% to the Compensation  Fund, 20% to
authorized  investment  companies,  20% to employees, and 40% to the population  at large.
The method of privatization  is chosen by the individual  company, subject to the approval
of the Agency  for Privatization  of the Republic  of Slovenia.  It is hoped that this framework  will
prove flexible enough yet simple enough to facilitate  rapid privatization  in 1993.
B. Financial  System Rehabilitation
Financial system rehabilitation has been recognized as a key to the transition to  market
economy. Punctioning  capital markets play a crucial role in the allocation and mobilization  of
resources.
The  main weaknesses of  the  Slovenian banking system were inherited from the  old
Yugoslavia. One bank, the Ljubljanska  Banka, enjoys a near-monopoly.  Also, Slovene banks
are owned by social enterprises, which have their representatives  sitting o l bank boards. But,
at the same time, these enterprises are the bank's major debtors. The negative  implications  of22
this kind of cross-ownership  were abundantly  evident  in the old Yugoslavia,  and have been seen
for example in Chile in the early 1980's (Diaz-Alejandro,  1985).
In addition, Slovenian  banks have a very high proportion  of non-performing  loans in their
portfolios (30-40%). This is a problem that may require governmental action, whether to
recapitalize  the banking system or to assume the bad-loan  portfolio.
Slovenia  has made a start on these  problems, auditing  banks in 1991  and establishing  a Bank
Restructuring  Agency  in the fall of that  year. In the next  years, financial  sector restructuring  will
be a key policy issue for the government.
C. Labor Market Legislation  and Practices
As a part of the comprehensive  economic transformation  toward a market economy, the
Slovenian  labor market  has undergone  major cl'anges in the last three years. Above  all, workers
can be laid off, and thus the Rubicon  of job security  has been crossed. Labor mobility  has been
enhanced  also by more flexible  hiring legislation.  The rigid system of wage determination  that
prevailed under self-management  has been replaced by collective  bargaining."'
But the last major improvements  of the functioning  of the labor market  occurred  in February
1991, when Slovenia significantly shortened the required advance notification period for
redundant  workers from 24 to six months. What is more, as an independent  country, Slovenia
made two moves that have hurt the economy  in the longer-run. In July 1991, following  the June
aggression  and the pending loss of the Yugoslav market, parliament halted new initiations  of
bankruptcy  procedures, and the Ministry of Labor began providing employment  subsidies  for
those enterprises unable to meet wage payments-no doubt, a bad industial policy.23
Moreover, there has been a lack  of trust and coordination  between  the two major institutional
players in  collective bargaining (the government and  the  trade unions), resulting in  the
suspension of incomes policy in February 1992. By August 1992, the total wage bill had
increased 40.2% in real terms (Ministry  of Planning  of Slovenia), seriously  threatening  to fuel
inflation. Establishment  of a more harmonious  labor-management  atmosphere  will be one of the
most important  imperatives  for future governments.
3. ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFlTS OF SEPARATION
3.1 The Costs of Separation
While Slovenia  may well benefit  in the long-run  from its separation  from Yugoslavia,  in the
short-run there are obvious  and significant  costs." 7 These include:  the cost of reorienting  trade;
growth of autarkic  tendencies;  the danger  of 'germanization'; heightened  perception  of political
risk in Slovenia  due to the war, and spillovers  from war-torn republics, such as the refugee
problem.
The cost of reorienting  trade has already proven significant.  In 1987, 35.7% of Slovenia's
deliveries went to the rest of Yugoslavia.  The war has temporarily disrupted this trade. In
adition,  ex-Yugoslav  states have erected trade barriers with each other, and most have non-
convertible currencies. Even Slovenia and Croatia now levy tariffs on each others' goods,
making trade diversion a  problem even with Slovenia's closest ally from ex-Yugoslavia.
Therefore, even  in the medium-term,  much of Slovenia's  trade with the old Yugoslavia  will have
to be reoriented.
The costs of reorientation  go well  beyond the search costs of finding  new customers. Slovene
producers had many advantages within the  Yugoslav market: familiarity with the market,24
customers' familiarity  with Slovene  goods, and superior  productivity  and quality  relative to other
Yugoslav producers. The international market is  far more difficult to penetrate and profit
margins are probably lower than on the old Yugoslav  market.
In addition, the Yugoslav  market provided a wider platform for Slovene  proddcers than the
Slovene market. Scale economies may be lost in the process of trade reorientation for this
reason, especially if Slovene producers are not able to redirect all of their lost sales on the
Yugoslav  market to third markets.
These problems  are somewhat  alleviated  by the high degree of disintegration  within former
Yugoslavia.  As noted in section 1, Yugoslav  regions tended to view their balance of trade as
distinct from the Federation as a whole, and had a good deal of freedom to  find their own
pattern of comparative  advantage.
Bole (1992) estimates  that the collapse  of the Yugoslav  market has caused Slovene  GDP to
shrink by 6%. In light of the 38% fall of Slovene  industrial  production  between  June 1989  and
June 1992, the collapse of the Yugoslav market appears not to have played a decisive role.
Rather, it seems to be one cause of problems, alongside  with hyperinflation,  the demand shock
involved  in the stabilization  attempt of 1990 and the stabilization  of 1991-92,  and the collapse
of the CMEA market.
Slovenia's  separation may also  enhance other  autarkic tendencies. Strategic military
arguments could be made for retaining and further developing  Slovenia's heavy industry base,
including  everything  from steel to computers.  For a small state like Slovenia,  this would  require
a greater deviation  from the country's current comparative  advantage  than for a larger entity  like
Yugoslavia. Furthermore, such a  move would reverse recent, probably healthy trends to25
restructure  Slovenian heavy  industry,  eliminating outdated and  ecologically damaging
technology.
A related, longer term problem is fear of g  nanization.  Given  the smaU  size of the Slovene
economy, the impact of a few significant  foreign  investments  could be quite large. A defensive
reaction, restricting the sales of Slovene assets to foreigners, could well take hold. Such a
reaction seems more likely in a smaU  state like Slovenia  than in a medium-sized  entity like the
old  Yugoslavia. The first indications of such a  reaction can be seen in  the new Slovene
governments' unwillingness  to allow foreigners  to buy land." 8
In addition, Slovenia's proximity (both  physical and political)  to ex-Yugoslavia  has resulted
in its sharing much  of the poQtical  risk associated  by foreign  investors  with Yugoslavia.  Slovenia
has been unable to gain admission  to the IMF through 1992, and its relationship  to the European
Community, although  good, has been far slower in developing  than other Central European
nations'.
A further strain on the Slovenia  economy  is the refugee pblem.  While the refugee situation
in Slovenia  is not nearly so bad as in Croatia, an estimated  75,000 refugees (3% of Slovenia's
population)  arrived between July 1991 and October 1992.
A key question is whether these costs will continue to affect Slovenia  over the medium  to
long-term.  Trade reorientation  costs are essentially  one-time  costs incurred during the transition
from one trade pattern to another. The ether costs have a longer duration. Trade diversion  will
continue as long as trade with other ex-Yugoslav  republics is disrupted, and even after that if
tariff or other barriers remain in place.26
Political risk, too, may linger for a considerable  period of time. How long will depend on
the success of Slovenian  diplomacy  in creating  a perception  that Slovenia  is quite different from
the rest of ex-Yugoslavia.  The refugee  problem, in turn, cannot  be solved  quickly, nor will the
issues of autarky and germanization  be immediately  settled. Hence, we may conclude that the
costs of separation  are felt in the short-run,  but may  continue  to accumulate  through  the medium-
term (probably to the end of the decade).
3.2 Benefits  of Separation
The overarching  benefit of separation  for Slovenia  has been political: exit from the chaos of
ex-Yugoslavia.  Following  the end of the one-week  war between  Slovenian  forces and Yugoslav
People's Army in late June-early July, 1991, Slovenia  has been able to separate  itself from the
brutality and violence  of the Yugoslav  war. It has also been able to keep extreme  political  forces
(above all  extreme nationalists) from gainig  significant power within Slovenia, thereby
facilitating  the establishment  of peaceful democratic  processes.
In the eyes of the Slovene people, this political benefit justifies any short-run economic
sacrifices. Nonetheless,  a case can be made for the proposition that Slovenia  will experience
medium and  long-term economic benefits. These fall  under three  headings: enhanced
macroeconomic  stability through Slovene sovereignty  and control over monetary and fiscal
policy; enhanced  capital  accumulation  through  the dismantling  of the old system  of redistribution
and faster access to the EC and its benefits.
Enhanced macroeconomic  stability  is the fruit of political sovereignty.  The old Yugoslavia
did not possess  adequate  federal mechanisms  for managing  the macroeconomy.  As noted above,
the formal  balance  of the Federal budget  hid  a significant  but unmeasured  deficit. The difficulties27
in  achieving approval by  aU the federal units in  parliament for compromises on  federal
allocations  made fiscal policy response  sluggish.  Disagreements  over taxation  policy also made
it difficult to achieve a coherent federal policy in this area." 9
Similarly,  federal monetary policy was hampered  by the political  set-up and power-balance
in the INBY.  With its governors chosen  by Republican  parliaments,  the central bank lacked any
substantial  degree of independence.  Controlled  by a coalition favoring redistribution  and easy
money, it chose to put out the fires that started at the regional level.'  For Slovenia, which
practiced greater fiscal discipline than other federal units, this  meant an unexpected and
unwanted  inflationary  impulse without corresponding  benefits.
It is in this context that Slovenia's  assumption  of fiscal and monetary  independence  must be
understood. The introduction  of the Slovenian  tolar, in particular, has proved an invaluable
instrument  in protecting Slovenia  from the hyperinflation  of the dinar in late 1991 and 1992. In
this sense, independent  Slovenia  might prove to be an optimal  currency area, for it has turned
out to be an area within which coherent monetary  policy has been politicaly feasible.
The point here is that Yugoslav regions--in  an ethnically heterogeneous  society  with large
differences in  economic development--functioned  as  distributional coalitions (Olson, 1982)
thereby preventing coherent fiscal and monetary policies and turning them into a vehicle of
redistribution.  Efficiency  was subordinated  to redistribution.  Hence, the potential  advantages  of
participation  in a larger entity were not realized, and separaticA  from the larger entity provided
an improvement  in this area.
Another  aspect of macroeconomic  stability  derives from Slovenia's new-found  flexibility  to
create labor market  institutions  appropriate  to its own circumstances.  With a small  economy  and28
a  fairly ethnically homogeneous workforce, Slovenia is  a  candidate for all-encompassing
corporatist bargaining  between labor and management.  Similar institutions  have proved highly
successful  in small, open European  economies  like Sweden  and Austria. They  provide a way to
keep the overall level of wage increases  within the bounds necessary  to ensure macroeconomic
stability. Also, they facilitate  achieve macroeconomic  targets (e.g. for exchange rates, relative
unit labor costs, and employment).(Layard,  1990)
Enhanced  capital  accumulation  is the second  benefit  expected  from Slovenian  separation.  This
benefit is contingent  on ending the practice of redistribution  of the old regime.
Interregional subsidization  was ended immediately  upon separation  from Yugoslavia.  But
cross-subsidization  is more  persistent. Thanks to the economic  collapse  engendered  by the war,
Slovenia  has been unable to end subsidies.  Reported  losses in 1991 reached 31.4 billion tolars
(8.7% of GDP) (Pleskovic  and Sachs, 1992),  with two-thirds  of the losses concentrated  among
the largest 100  industrial enterprises.  As was mentioned  in section  2, wage subsidies  have been
employed to keep insolvent  enterprises  afloat.
The key question  is whether  independent  Slovenia  will be in a better position to end cross-
subsidization  than it would  have  been within  Yugoslavia.  The passage  of privatization  legislation
suggests that the answer may well be yes. Slovenia's political system still must find a way to
carry through  bankruptcy  and rehabilitate  the financial  system.  Nonetheless,  Slovenia's  progress
so far  compares favorably with what Yugoslavia achieved in  1990, when the Markovic
govemment's privatization  and restructuring  program became  hopelessly  mired in interregional
conflict.29
If  the process of  restructuring the financial and industrial sector is  successful, capital
accumulation  should  improve. The old pattern of subsidization  effectively  taxed more successful
enterprises while subsidizing  the less successful  ones. Estimates  by Vodopivec (1989) suggest
that this had a negative effect on productivity. Similarly, Kraft (1992a) has found that soft-
budget finance allowed loss-making  enterprises to maintain their investment  despite continued
loss-making.
Another factor contributing  to faster capital  accumulation,  as well as higher living standards,
will be Slovenia's ability to fashion its own tariff policies. The less-developed  regions of
Yugoslavia  stoutly resisted lowering tariff barriers. Slovenia, with its greater competitiveness,
should be able to lower tariff barriers much further than Yugoslavia  as a whole.
There is a danger  here as well. As a small economy,  Slovenia  is forced to be open. Whether
it can thrive in a competitive  international  environment  remains to be seen.
A third benefit is faster access  to the EC. Yugoslavia's  aspirations  to enter the EC have been
frustrated  by its inability  to meet EC human  rights and political  democracy  conditions.  A major
impetus for Slovenian  independence  was the assessment  that the Milosevic  leadership  in Serbia
was unwilling  to resolve  the Kosovo  situation  in a way satisfactory  to the EC (as well as the rest
of the international  community).
Slovenian  independence  appears to have unblocked  the way to Europe. Close co-operation
with both EFTA and the EC have already begun, including  the disbursement  of funds for small-
business aid and other programs in August, 1992. While the continuation  of the war renders
Slovenia's situation somewhat  uncertain, it appears that Slovenia  is on a much faster track to
Europe than any of the other ex-Yugoslav  republics. 2130
What will closer association  with Europe mean for Slovenia?  First, it will mean a stamp of
approval  for foreign  investment  in Slovenia.  Second,  it will mean  guaranteed  access to European
markets. Third, membership  would also allow Slovenes  to work anywhere in Europe without
special permission, and likewise would allow EC citizens  to work in Slovenia.  Fourth, should
Slovenia accede to the EC, it would probably be eligible for funds from the EC's  regional
program (ERDF, ESF).  These funds have proved a  major enticement for the poorer EC
members (Ireland, Portugal, Greece especially.)
Of course, it is far from inevitable  that Slovenia  will become  a full member  of the EC. Such
a development  is hard to foresee  within the current decade. But closer association  seems  highly
realistic, with ties growing stronger rather rapidly.
Even without membership  in the EC, Slovenia  has managed to greatly increase the inflow
of foreign investment. Direct foreign investment roughly tripled in value between 1989 and
1990, and grew another 40% in 1991 despite the war (Ministry of Finance, 1992). Although
most of these investments are small, they seem a hopeful good portent of things to come.
Leading  European companies  now involved  in Slovenia  include Siemens, Renault  and Henkel,
and three major Austran banks, including  Creditanstalt,  are represented  as well.
4. CONCLUSIONS
One year is not a very long time to draw conclusions  about the prospects of independent
Slovenia. Perhaps matters will look  quite different a  few years  hence. Therefore,  any
conclusions  drawn at this early stage must be tentative.
First, despite  the obvious  costs Slovenia  has incurred in the short-run, prospects of medium
and  long-run  economic benefits seem  fairly  good.  Above  all,  the  ability  to  pursue31
macroeconomic  stability, the fruit of political  independence  and a separate  currency, promises
to pay off in the not too distant future. Membership,  or at least closer relationship  with the EC
also  appears likely, and would prove highly beneficial. The  ending of  old  interregional
redistributive  practices, if coupled with the ending of cross-subsidization,  and the fashioning  of
new institutions, especially  labor market institutions, appropriate  to Slovenia, hold out further
benefits.
Second, Slovenia's case does not prove that any separation  from a larger entity would be
welfare increasing. In fact, Slovenia's separation from Yugoslavia might not have been as
beneficial as  it has been already had Yugoslav poUtics come out differently. Had forces
amenable  to rational  debate  and compromise  prevailed  in Yugoslavia,  Slovenian  secession  might
have been welfare decreasing.
Slovenia's  experience suggests  that secession  from a larger entity  that is wrecked  by political
instability may have economic  benefits. If local political  autonomy  provides the opportunity  to
introduce a new currency and achieve macroeconomic  stabilization, separation can become
economically  attractive. However, this can only work if the local political  constellation  is not
controlled  by distributive  coalitions  bent on preserving  the old redistributive  system, and is not
hampered  by major political  divisions that paralyze decision-making.  In short, secession  can be
beneficial if  the  new state is  more homogeneous in  its composition and coherent in  its
functioning  than the old state was.
Not all of the costs Slovenia  has faced would  be felt by other newly independent  states. In
the Czech-Slovak  breakup, for example, political  risk and refugee cost (or more properly costs32
due to migration)  are much smaller than in the Slovene  case. Indeed, the Czech Republic may
face a similar situation to Slovenia's: short-term costs but potential  long-term gains.
Slovenia's circumstances are  fortunate. It  is  ethnically homogeneous, culturally and
historically compatible with the West, and enjoys proximity to  (and some protection from)
friendly  Western neighbors.  Furthermore,  even though  political  divisions  have been sharp, it has
shown a political  will to fight counterproductive  redistribution.
There may not be a Slovenian model for anyone to copy. But there is a growing body of
useful experience that Slovenia  has to offer other new post-Communist  nations.33
ENDNOTES
1. We refer to Yugoslavia's  republics  and autonomous  provinces  as "regions" for convenience.
2. For a taxonomy  of the Yugoslav  economic  system, see Ben-Ner and Neuberger (1990).
3. See the discussion  of this and an opposing  view -- attributing  the failure to workers' control
of raterprises  -- in Vodopivec  (1992).
4. Yugoslavia  has traditionally  been plagued  by inflation. Inflation  rose from about 30 percent
in 1980 to full hyperinflation  by the end of 1989.
5. That r.e  would be about 5 to 6 percent (the GM? of less-developed  regions was aLbut one-
third of that of the more-developed  regions in 1986).
6.  Burkett and Skegro (1988) detect no disintegrative tendencies. Their test, however, is
seriously flawed. First, they use the pre-1976 industry  classification,  which  lumps together  the
production of intermediate and final products within sectors (metals, minerals, chemicals,
textiles, wood and  leather).  Such an aggregation prevents the  detection of  rounding-off
tendencies within such sectors--the type of  rounding-off  that piobably was very common.
Second,  interregional  trade flows are measured  with unacceptable  imprecision.  They  are obtained
indirectly,  as the difference  between the region's production  and consumption,  and the estimates
of consumption  are based on the assumption that regional consumption  is proportional to the
production share of the region in  the Yugoslav total (on the industry level)--a very poor
assumption (especially  for intermediate  production).
7. See Government  of Slovenia  (1992), Bank of Slovenia  (1992)  and Op de Beke (1991).
8. This puts Slovenia  at a great advantage  compared to the states of the former Soviet Union.
Even the Czech and Slovak Republics had to revamp the whole budget process, converting
subsidies  and direct appropriation  of enterprise revenues  into the State budget,  just before their
separation.
9.  Indeed, the organizational  structure of the central banking system of former Yugoslavia
provided the basic institutional set-up for the currency reform. In  Yugoslavia the regional
National  Banks  executed  commonly  agreed-upon  monetary  policy  on the regions' territories.  This
institutional  heritage gave Slovenia  a big advantage  over the ex-Soviet  Republics.
10. The first step towards introducing  a new currency  was the printing of coupons in summer
1990. This was seen as an emergency  measure, taken in light of the increasing  danger of a new
hyperinflationary  cycle following  the failure of the second phase of the Markovic program. It
proved extremely  important in facilitating  a smooth  currency exchange.
11. We do not mean to argue that Slovenia  had achieved  full stabilization.  Inflation  in October,
1992  rose to 3.5% per month,  following  substantial  wage  increases,  and unemployment  remained34
near 11%.  Nonetheless,  these figures compare well with the near-hyperinflation  in the rest of
ex-Yugoslavia.
12. Reserves were also built up in the process of housing  privatization, which  began following
the passage of the Housing Law in November 1991. (Gray and Stiblar, 1992)
13. See Cvikl (1990).
14. The effectiveness  of indirect monetary  instruments  will be impaired as long as loss-making
enterprises  and banks are not restructured.  Important  preconditions  also include  the development
of short-term financial  and capital markets.
15. Slovenia  BOP current account  was in surplus  throughout  the 1980's, with the only exception
being 1990, when the exchange  rate was fixed  as part of the Federal Government's  anti-inflation
program.
16. For a discussion  of recent trends, legislation  and major issues concerning  the labor market,
see Vodopivec  and Hribar-Milic  (1992).
17. Even before the civil war, these costs were so apparent  that the leading Slovene  economist,
Aleksander Bajt, warned that the drive for independence  could not be justified on economic
grounds.[Bajt, 1991] Bajt's  argument makes sense only if  the alternative is an integrated,
peaceful Yugoslavia.  Lacking such an alternative, independence  was simply  a necessity.
18. It should be noted, however, that several other East European countries have forbidden
foreign landownership  as well.
19. An old, but nonetheless  relevant diagnosis  of Yugoslavia's  institutional  inability to conduct
fiscal policy is found in Horvat, Hadziomerac  et al (1973)
20. The same forces also undermined  the ability  of the federal  government  to conduct  consistent
policies in other areas, for example  price controls (see above).
21. Slovene  negotiators  have asked  both the EBRD  and the IMF to grant Slovenia  the minimum
necessary shareholding  for membership,  pending resolution of the apportionment  of the debts
of ex-Yugoslavia.  Slovene  sources claim that the EBRD has accepted  this offer, but the EBRD
refuses comment. (Euromoney, 1992)35
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bajt, A. "Visoka Cena Samostalnosti"  (The High Price of Independence)  Danas, Aprl,  1991.
Bank  of Slovenia,  Annual Report for 1991, Ljubljana, 1992.
Ben-Ner  and E. Neuberger, "The Feasibility  of Planned-Market  Systems:  The Yugoslav  Visible
Hand and Negotiated  Planning"  Journal  of Comparative  Economics  14, 4, 1991,  pp. 768-790.
Bole, V.,  "Slovensko  Gospodarstvo  v splosnem "neravnotezju""  (The Slovenian  Economy in
General DiMsequilibrium)  Gospodarska  Gibanja,  230, August, 1992, pp. 23-36.
Bole, V. and M. Gaspari, "The Yugoslav  Path to High Inflation." In M. Bruno, S. Fisher,
E. Helpman  and N. Liviatan, eds., Lessons of Economic  Stabilization  and its Aftermath,
Cambridge, Mass., 1991, pp. 359-393.
Burkett, J. and B. Skegro, "Are Economic  Fractures  Widening?"  in Dennison  Rusinow, ed.,
YugoslaWa:  Fractured  Federalism,  Washington,  DC, 1988, pp. 142-155.
Cvikl, M., Denarna Politika Osemdesetih  Let v Jugoslaviji,  (Yugoslav  Monetary  Policy in the
1980's) unpublished  M.Sc. thesis, University  of Ljubljana, July, 1990.
Cvild, M., The Role of Social  Accounting  Office (SDK)  in Former Yugoslavia,  World Bank,
mimeo, 1992.
Diaz-Alejandro,  C., "Goodbye  Financial  Repression,  Hello Financial  Crash." Journal of
Development  Economics, 19, 1985, pp. 1-24.
Epstein, G.A. and J.B. Schor, The Political  Economy  of Central  Banking, Discussion  Paper No.
1281, November 1986, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University.
Euromoney,  "Slovenia:  An End to the Deadlock" September  1992, pp. 182-187.
Federal Statistical  Office, Statistical Yearbook  of Yugoslavia  (in Serbo-Croat),  various years.
Gerschenkron,  A., Economic  Backwardness  in Historical  Perspective,  Cambridge,  Mass., 1962.
Government  of Republic  of Slovenia,  Slovenia  Year One, Slovenia  - Economy  in Transition,
mimeo, 1992.
Gray, C. and F. Stiblar, "The Evolving  Legal Framework  for Private Sector Activity  in
Slovenia," World Bank, WPS No. 893, April, 1992.
Horvat, B. et al, "The Economic  Functions  of the Federation"  East European  Economics, 1973.36
Kraft, E., "Soft-budget  subsidies  and Investment  finance  in Yugoslavia:  A model with estimates
for 1986-7",  mimeo, Salisbury  State University, 1992a.
Kraft, E., "Regional  Policy in Yugoslavia,  1966-90:  Measurement  of Flows and Evaluation of
Effectiveness"  Comparative  Economic  Studies, 4 (Winter), forthcoming, 1992b
Kraft, E.,"The Growth of Small Enterprise  and the Private Sector in Yugoslavia"  in Perry L.
Patterson, ed. Capitalist  Goals, Socialist Past: The  Rise of the Private Sector in Command
Economies, Boulder, 1993, forthcoming.
Kraft, E. and M. Vodopivec,  "How Soft Is the Budget  Constraint  on Yugoslav  Firms?"  Journal
of Comparative  Economics 16, September,  1992, pp. 432-455.
Layard, R., "Wage Bargaining,  Incomes  Policy and Inflation:  Possible Lessons for Eastern
Europe" World Bank  Seminar  on Managing  Inflation  in Socialist  Economies,  Vienna,  March
1990, mimeo.
Ministry of Finance, Republic  of Slovenia, "Sponsorship  Statement",  reprinted in Euromoney,
September, 1992, pp. 190-193.
Olson, M.,  The  Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social
Rigidities, New Haven, 1982.
Op de Beke, A., The Tolar - Slovenia's New Currency, mimeo, 1991.
Pleskovic, B. and J. Sachs, "Political  Independence  and Economic  Reform in Slovenia" in
0.  Blanchard,  K. Froot and J. Sachs, eds, Transition  in Eastern Europe, Chicago, 1993
forthcoming.
Rocha,  R., "Inflation  and Stabilization  in Yugoslavia,"  Contemporary  Policy  Issues, 10, 4, 1992,
pp. 21-38.
Rocha, R. and F. Saldanha,  Fiscal and Quasi-Fiscal  Deficits, Nominal  and Real, World Bank,
WPS No. 919, 1992.
Schrenk, M. et al, Yugoslavia.  Self-Management  Socialism: Challenges  of Development,
Baltimore, 1979.
Vodopivec, M., "Productivity  Effects of Redistribution  in Yugoslavia"  unpublished  Ph.D.
dissertation,  University of Maryland, 1989.
Vodopivec, M., and S. Hribar-Milic, "The Slovenian  Labor Market in Transition"
Mimeo, 1992Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1  102 Did the Debt  Crisis  or Declining  Oil  Andrew  M. Warner  February  1993  M. Divino
Prices  Cause  Mexico's  Investment  33739
Collapse?
WPS1  103 Capital  Mobility  in Developing  Peter  J. Montiel  February  1993  R. Vo
Countries:  Some  Measurement  Issues  31047
and Empirical  Eetimates
WPS1  104 Trade Policy  Reform  in Latin  America Asad  Alam  February  1993  J. Troncoso
and  the Caribbean  in  the 1980s  Sarath  Rajapatirana  37826
WPSI  105 Estimating  Quasi-Fiscal  Deficits  in  Philippe  Le Houerou  February  1993  N. Velasco
a Consistency  Framework:  The  Case  Hector  Sierra  34346
of Madagascar
WPS1  106 Improving  Women's  Access  to  Halil  Dundar  February  1993  S. David
Higher  Education:  A Review  of World  Jennifer  Haworth  33752
Bank Project  Experience
WPS1  107 Financial  Reform  Lessons  and  Gerard  Caprio,  Jr.  February  1993  W. Pitayatonakarn
Strategies  Izak Atiyas  37664
James  Hanson
WPS1  108 Public  Output  and Private  Decisions: Thanos  Catsambas  February  1993  A. Correa
Conceptual  Issues  in the Evaluation  38549
of Govemment  Activities  and  Their
Implications  for Fiscal  Policy
WPS1  109 Risk Management  and  Stable  Andrew  Sheng  Mach 1993  M. Raggambi
Financial  Structures  Yoon  Je Cho  37664
WPS1  110 What  Would  Happen  If AlI  Developing Will Martin  March  1993  D. Gustafson
Countries  Expanded  Their  Manufactured  33714
Expons?
WPS1  111 Foreign  Investment  Law  in Central  Cheryl  W.  Gray  March  1993  M. Berg
and Eastern  Europe  William  Jarosz  31450
WPS1  112 Privatization,  Concentration,  and  Ying  Qian  March  1993  S. Lipscomb
Pressure  for Protection:  A Steel  Ronald  C. Duncan  33718
Sector Study
WPS1113  The Lucky  Few  Amidst  Economic  Christiaan  Grootaert  March  1993  E. Vitanov
Decline:  Distributional  Change  in  Ravi  Kanbur  38400
C6te d'lvoire  As Seen  Through  Panel
Data Sets,  1985-88
WPS1  114 Does  Price  Uncertainty  Really  Anita  George  March  1993  D. Bievenour
Reduce  Private Investment?  Jacques  Morisset  37899
A Small  Model  Applied  to ChilePolicy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1  115  Looking  at  the  Facts:  What  We  Know Ross  Levine  March  1993  D. Evans
about  Policy  and  Growth  from  Cross- Sara  Zervos  38526
Country  Analysis
WPS1  116  Implications  of Agricultural  Trade  Antonio  Salazar  Brandao  March  1993  D. Gustafson
Liberalization  for  the  Developing  Wiil  Martin  33714
Countries
WPS1117  Portfolio  Investment  Flows  to  Sudarshan  Gooptu  March  1993  R.  Vo
Emerging  Markets  31047
WPS1  118  Trends  in Retirement  Systems  and  Olivia  S.  Mitchell  March  1993  ESP
Lessons  for Reform  33680
WPSI  1119  The  North  American  Free  Trade  Raed  Safadi  March  1993  J. Jacobson
Agreement:  Its  Effect  on South  Asia  Alexander  Yeats  33710
WPS1  120  Policies  for Coping  with  Price  Donald  F.  Larson  March  1993  D. Gustafson
Uncertainty  for Mexican  Maize  33714
WPS1  121  Measuring  Capital  Flight:  A Case  Harald  Eggerstedt  March  1993  H.  Abbey
Study  of  Mexico  Rebecca  Brideau  Hall  80512
Sweder  van  Wijnbergen
WPS1  122  Fiscal  Decentralization  in  Transitional  Richard  Bird  March  1993  B. Pacheco
Economies:  Toward  a Systemic  Christine  Wallich  37033
Analysis
WPS1  123  Social  Development  is Economic  Nancy  Birdsall  April  1993  S. Rothschild
Development  37460
WPS1  124  A New  Database  on  Human  Capital  Vikram  Nehru  April  1993  M.  Coleridge-
Stock:  Sources,  Methodology,  and  Eric  Swanson  Taylor
Results  Ashutosh  Dubey  33704
WPS1  125  Industrial  Development  and  the  Adriaan  Ten  Kate  April  1993  C. Jones
Environment  in  Mexico  37699
WPS1  126  The  Costs  and  Benefits  of Slovenian  Milan  Cviki  April  1993  S. Moussa
Independence  Evan  Kraft  39019
Milan  Vodopivec
WPS1  127 How  International  Economic  Links  Vikram  Nehru  April  1993  M.  Coleridge-
Affect  East  Asia  Taylor
33704
WPS1  128  The  International  Ocean  Transport  Hans  JOrgen  Peters  April  1993  J. Lucas-
Industry  in Crisis:  Assessing  the  Walker
Reasons  and  Outlook  31078